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A Roundtable on
Robert K. Brigham,
Reckless: Henry Kissinger and the
Tragedy of Vietnam
Amanda Demmer, Richard A. Moss, Scott Laderman, Luke A. Nichter,
David F. Schmitz, Robert K. Brigham
Introduction to the Roundtable on Robert K. Brigham,
Reckless

F

Amanda Demmer

ew historical figures from the second half of the
twentieth century provoke disagreement like Henry
Kissinger. More than the usual dose of healthy
scholarly debate, Kissinger inspires assessments so
diametrically opposed that readers can be forgiven for
wondering if authors are writing about the same person. It
is unsurprising, then, that Robert K. Brigham’s new book,
Reckless: Henry Kissinger and the Tragedy of Vietnam, has
already ignited a fresh round of debate about Kissinger and
his legacy.
There are three things upon which each of this
roundtable’s participants agree. The first is that Brigham’s
book is incredibly well-written and will appeal to
specialists, undergraduates, and popular audiences alike.
The second is that Brigham’s book pursues an ambitious
and worthwhile goal. In Reckless, Brigham sets out to be
the first scholar to hold Kissinger’s “record to a scrupulous
account based on his own definitions of success and the
evidence provided by recently released material.”1 In
what we might call a temporally and thematically focused
biography, Reckless provides an overview of Kissinger’s
Vietnam-related thinking and diplomacy from 1965 to 1973
in six chronological chapters. Brigham’s final assessment is
clearly indicted in his title. He argues that “it is clear that
the national security adviser’s war for peace was more
than oxymoronic: it was a total failure.”2 Beyond failing
to achieve his aims, Brigham concludes that Kissinger
tragically “made a bad situation worse…with his reckless
assumptions about the use of force and diplomacy.”3
In David F. Schmitz’s assessment, Reckless “brilliantly
succeeds” in its objectives. Schmitz characterizes
Reckless as a “seminal study” of Kissinger’s Vietnam War
diplomacy that crucially “challenges and corrects many
of Kissinger’s and his defenders’ distortions, setting the
record straight on a number of important points.” Scott
Laderman offers a similar assessment and notes that
Brigham “fills a surprising gap in the literature.” Although
Kissinger “features prominently in a number of important
works,” Laderman explains, “very little of the literature
has placed Kissinger at its center.” Like Schmitz, Laderman
also praises Reckless for calling “into question the myth
of Kissinger—which Kissinger himself studiously helped
to foster—as the man who successfully achieved ‘peace
with honor’ in Vietnam.” Richard A. Moss and Luke A.
Nichter offer disparate evaluations. Moss suggests Reckless
suffers from “sins of commission as well as omission”
and is “uneven,” with the core of the book offering more
nuanced assessments than the opening and closing.
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Moss’ review, more specifically, takes issue with Reckless’
coverage of Operation Pennsylvania and Operation Lam
Son 719 and some of Brigham’s sourcing decisions. Nichter
also suggests that Reckless is ultimately “not convincing”
because “Brigham focuses on too many issues that are not
important while overlooking too many issues that are.”
The reality that Kissinger is still alive and actively
seeking to influence the history written about the events
in which he played a principle role is apparent in each
of these reviews. Whereas Schmitz and Laderman
commend Brigham for dispelling some of Kissinger’s own
mythmaking, Nichter challenges Brigham’s approach and
argues—based on a “recent meeting” with Kissinger—that
the National Security Adviser “did not have nearly the
freedom of action that Brigham assumes he did.” While
Sarah Snyder has recently reminded us that there were
important limits to Kissinger’s influence, Brigham makes
a persuasive case that Kissinger believed he was the only
man who could achieve peace with honor and, based on
this assumption, did everything he could to consolidate
policymaking in the White House at the expense of the
rest of the U.S. foreign policy bureaucracy.4 That both
Kissinger’s underlying assumptions and his methods were
flawed, Brigham argues, is part of the tragedy.
Whether offering praise or disapprobation, a third
common thread in each of the following reviews is the desire
for more. While some roundtable participants would have
liked to have seen Brigham expand his coverage of events
that appear briefly in the text, others note that inclusion of
non-Vietnam related concerns would have provided greater
context. I also wonder how expanding the book’s temporal
scope to incorporate Kissinger’s involvement in planning
the U.S. evacuation from Saigon in April 1975 would have
impacted Reckless’ narrative. Brigham acknowledges that
this desire for an expanded “portrait of Kissinger” is a “fair
critique” and the inevitable result of writing “a trade press
book…with a strict word limit.”
Although the participants in this roundtable disagree
vociferously about many aspects of Brigham’s new book,
the points of consensus demonstrate resoundingly that
Reckless is an accessible, necessary intervention that revisits
well-tread topics in new and provocative ways. Indeed,
despite his many criticisms, Nichter describes Reckless as
“the first in a new genre” and suggests “we will be talking
about this book, and others it will prompt, for many years.”
While the scholarly debates about Kissinger and his legacy
are far from settled, then, it is clear that moving forward
such discussions will be incomplete without serious
engagement with Reckless.
Notes:
1. Brigham, Reckless, ix.
2. Ibid, xi.
3. Ibid, xii.
4. Sarah B. Snyder, “Beyond ‘The Architect,’” Sources and Methods, 23
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want and the weak suffer, as they must” (45). Brigham
points out that Kissinger’s prolific output—three volumes
of memoirs, documentary collections, and foreign policy
analyses—has been an attempt to shape (and distort) the
Review of Robert K. Brigham, Reckless: Henry Kissinger
historical record (93–94, 146). Perhaps Kissinger is living by
and the Tragedy of Vietnam
Nixon’s comment to him many decades ago: “Now, Henry,
remember, we’re gonna be around to outlive our enemies.”3
Richard A. Moss1
Brigham provides a readable, entertaining account that
will no doubt appeal to a broad audience. However, it is not
a comprehensive account of the tragedy in Vietnam under
s I read Reckless: Henry Kissinger and the Tragedy of
Kissinger and the president he served. The book is uneven it
Vietnam, I was torn between hope in the book’s
its treatment of the subject; its first quarter and last chapter
claim to be “the first to hold [Kissinger’s] record to a
have a more argumentative tone, while the middle half of
scrupulous account based on his own definitions of success
the book is more nuanced. The depiction of the twists and
and the evidence provided by recently released material”
turns in U.S.-North Vietnamese negotiations in 1972 are
(xi) and the dissonance I experienced as I dug into the
particularly revealing. Unfortunately, some of the details
details. This review focuses on the evolution of Kissinger’s
throughout the book could be better sourced, and there are
thinking about Vietnam, a sequencing error in Reckless
issues of omission as well as commission.
on Operation Lam Son 719, and
For example, in his first chapter
the Nixon tapes and Kissinger
on the evolution of Kissinger’s
telephone conversation (telcon) In his first chapter on the evolution of Kissinger’s thinking about Vietnam, it is
transcripts related to Nixon and thinking about Vietnam, it is surprising that surprising that Brigham does not
Brigham does not explore the role Kissinger explore the role Kissinger played
Kissinger’s relationship.
First, an aside. I’m something played in Operation PENNSYLVANIA, an effort in Operation PENNSYLVANIA,
of a one-trick pony in my to bring Hanoi to the negotiating table in 1967 via an effort to bring Hanoi to the
relationship and exposure (by two French intermediaries, Herbert Marcovich negotiating table in 1967 via two
choice!) to the Nixon tapes. It and Raymond Aubrac. Instead, Brigham focuses French intermediaries, Herbert
was my day-job at the State on the details surrounding Kissinger’s first trip Marcovich and Raymond Aubrac.
to South Vietnam in 1965.
Department to transcribe the
Instead, Brigham focuses on the
tapes for inclusion in the official
details surrounding Kissinger’s
documentary record, the Foreign
first trip to South Vietnam in
Relations of the United States
1965 (15–21). The narrative then jumps from late 1965 to
series, for longer than was probably healthy (mentally or
Kissinger’s Foreign Affairs article in January 1969, as if little
physically) or prudent. Adding to the exposure, I have
or nothing happened over the intervening three years.4
used the tapes extensively in my own research since 2002,
While Brigham mentions Operation PENNSYLVANIA
when the National Archives and Records Administration
in the second chapter, it is only a passing reference to an
(NARA) made public its Third Chronological Release (tapes
initiative that “went nowhere” and to the fact that the
recorded between January and June 1972).
relationship between Kissinger and Aubrac aided in setting
Thanks to the tapes (“the gift that keeps on giving,”
up a back channel with North Vietnam in 1969 (57–58).
per Bob Woodward), the copious telcon transcripts kept by
There should be little doubt that Operation
Kissinger and others, the diaries of chief of staff H. R. “Bob”
PENNSYLVANIA served multiple purposes and showed
Haldeman, and the millions of pages of other textual records,
an evolution of Kissinger’s thinking on Vietnam.
the Nixon administration is one of the best-documented U.S.
PENNSYLVANIA paved the way for what would become
presidential administrations (if not the best-documented).2
known as the “San Antonio Formula,” after a speech (in San
In these rich sources there is ample evidence to support one
Antonio) in which President Johnson said that the United
school of thought, which holds that Henry Kissinger was
States would stop all aerial and naval bombardment of
a self-aggrandizing, manipulative, scheming, emotional
North Vietnam in exchange for peace negotiations.5 It has
sycophant who was, arguably, guilty of war crimes during
been publicly known since 1968 that Kissinger promoted
the Nixon and Ford administrations. Another school of
the San Antonio formula and was directly involved in the
thought, also supported by the documentary record, can
negotiations.6 In the words of biographer Walter Isaacson,
claim that Kissinger was a principled, thoughtful, tireless
“Thus began Kissinger’s first experience with secret
public servant who sought peace and tried to improve
diplomacy and his baptism into the difficulties of dealing
America’s position in the world vis-à-vis adversaries and
with the North Vietnamese.”7
allies alike. Contradictory traits exist in everybody to some
In December 1967 Kissinger made a trip to Moscow
degree, but the level to which they existed (and still exist) in
under the auspices of the Soviet-American Disarmament
Henry Kissinger make him a fascinating subject of inquiry, a
Study group. Although separate from the failed negotiations
kind of devious bogeyman to some, and a realist statesman
of the summer of 1967, this trip was an attempt to revive the
and master diplomat to others.
PENNSYLVANIA talks. It demonstrated that Kissinger had
By choosing a title like Reckless and adopting the tone
begun to develop his ideas for linkage between Moscow
of a prosecutor in a courtroom during the first and last
and Hanoi more than a full year before he became Nixon’s
parts of the book, Robert Brigham places himself more in
national security advisor. U.S. documents released in
the first school of thought. “For all his faults, Kissinger
2008, coverage of this trip in Niall Ferguson’s biography
(no matter what) could not change reality on the ground,”
of Kissinger, and a 1992 memoir account by Soviet foreign
Brigham contends. “He made a bad situation worse,
policy expert Georgi Arbatov show that Kissinger came
however, with his reckless assumptions about the use of
to believe that the road to peace in Vietnam went through
force and diplomacy” (xii). For Brigham, “Kissinger was a
Moscow.8
careful reader of Spinoza and Kant, and he learned from
As Brigham argues, the idea that Moscow would
both that history is tragedy, but that men of free will can
try to persuade Hanoi to make meaningful concessions
bend history toward a new reality” (44). Channeling the
in negotiations with the United States out of a desire for
Melian dialogue from Thucydides, “Kissinger naturally
progress on arms control and other areas of superpower
thought . . . that Moscow could easily influence events in
relations was largely flawed. Ultimately, there would be no
Hanoi because he believed that the powerful do what they
linkage. Kissinger “did not understand that for Moscow,
July 2018, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/beyond-thearchitect?utm_content=buffer72e47&utm_medium=social&utm_
source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer.

A
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forcing Hanoi to concede its first principles carried with
in 1971, could use more detail. Brigham does a good job of
it unacceptable costs and risks” (45). Brigham contends
describing the operation, but the inclusion of a map or two
that Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador to the
showing the geography of the area would be very helpful,
United States and Kissinger’s sparring partner in a secret
and photographs, say, of South Vietnamese troops clinging to
back channel, was an “unwilling partner in the plan,” and
helicopter skids, would have added a lot to his well-written
“neither would be happy with the result” (45).
descriptions. Also, sourcing is again an issue. Brigham
While flawed, Kissinger’s beliefs about Moscow were
mentions that Kissinger “had recent intelligence estimates
not entirely wrong. Moscow was Hanoi’s primary patron,
suggesting Hanoi’s strength in the area was nearly twentyand the Kremlin had some influence with its client state.
five thousand troops and that two more North Vietnamese
North Vietnam did not manufacture sophisticated surfacedivisions were likely to arrive soon” (141). However, there
to-air missiles, jetfighters, and main battle tanks, and
is no source provided for this statement.
Moscow could (and occasionally did) moderate the flow of
In the same paragraph, Brigham describes how General
arms and materiel to Hanoi’s war machine. Kissinger used
William Westmoreland, then Army chief of staff and
“the Channel” with Dobrynin to pass messages to Hanoi,
formerly the U.S. commander in Vietnam, told Kissinger
attempt to limit Soviet assistance to North Vietnam, and
that Operation Lam Son 719 “was too complex, required
make it possible for Moscow and Washington to delink
too much close air coordination and communication,
Vietnam from superpower relations with a successful and
for the ARVN to be successful (141–42).” In view of the
politically profitable summit meeting in Moscow in May
(uncited) intelligence he received and the advice he got
1972. Kissinger and Dobrynin built an institution that made
from an experienced military commander, it would seem
an improvement in superpower relations possible, and they
that Kissinger should have known the raid would fail.
were largely pleased with the results. Kissinger solidified
However, the Westmoreland conversation took place in
his power and that of the White House-based National
April 1971. It was a postmortem of the operation, not an
Security Council (NSC) vis-à-vis
advance warning.
the State and Defense departments,
The formula that Kissinger was
while Dobrynin became a member The formula that Kissinger was wrong and wrong and should have known
should have known better is a little too much better is a little too much like
of the Central Committee.
Nevertheless, it took time like Monday morning quarterbacking for Monday morning quarterbacking
to realize that there was a limit my taste. Brigham repeatedly mentions that for my taste. Brigham repeatedly
to how much influence a patron North Vietnam was going to settle the conflict mentions that North Vietnam was
can exert on its clients. In a back- by force of arms, and yet Kissinger continued going to settle the conflict by force of
channel meeting after the North to negotiate and gradually eroded the U.S. arms, and yet Kissinger continued
conditions.
Vietnamese launched the Easter
to negotiate and gradually eroded
Offensive in 1972, Dobrynin
the U.S. conditions. Boxed in by the
remarked, “Isn’t it amazing what a
realities on the ground and Nixon’s
little country can do to wreck well-laid plans?” Kissinger
desire to Vietnamize the war, what were the alternatives to
replied, “The president wants you to know we will under
using force? Politics is the art of the possible. Hanoi seemed
no circumstances accept a defeat there and we will do what
willing to accept nothing less than a complete withdrawal of
is necessary not to.”9 The eventual result was Linebacker
American forces, but that was probably beyond the realm of
and the mining of Haiphong Harbor. Both Washington
the possible for a conservative Republican administration.
and Moscow considered cancelling the Moscow summit;
Therein lay a Catch-22. The recent past was no guide, either.
Washington because it saw Soviet aid to the North as
The United States had not unilaterally withdrawn from
facilitating the Easter Offensive, and Moscow because of
Korea, and American forces remain on the Korean Peninsula
ideological solidarity with Hanoi. The Kissinger-Dobrynin
today, nearly seven decades after a ceasefire. Did Kissinger
channel made possible the delinking of Vietnam from the
and Nixon consider a similar solution for Vietnam? Aside
larger issue of superpower relations.
from criticizing the escalation policies, perhaps Brigham
Brigham describes several Kissinger-Dobrynin
could have explored this possibility or others.12
exchanges but, curiously, does not mention or cite SovietBrigham is generally correct about the fallout from the
American Relations: The Détente Years, 1969–1972, jointly
India-Pakistan war, the leak of sensitive crisis-response
compiled, translated, and annotated by the U.S. Department
documents to investigative journalist Jack Anderson, and
of State and the Russian Foreign Ministry in 2007. This
the subsequent discovery by the Plumbers (of Watergate
treasure trove includes both Kissinger and Dobrynin’s
ignominy) that the military was spying on the (NSC) (160–
accounts of their back-channel exchanges.11 Dobrynin’s
64). The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) received information
contemporary observations of Kissinger would have
via a Navy yeoman, Charles Radford, who was assigned
enabled Brigham to avoid relying solely on Kissinger’s
to the JCS-NSC liaison office. Brigham appears to have
reports of the meetings and probably would have bolstered
fallen prey to Kissinger’s explanation in his memoir that
some of his arguments.
he was “out of favor” with Nixon for “several weeks” after
In addition, Brigham’s account of Operation Lam Son
the India-Pakistan war and the Moorer-Radford affair, as it
719, the U.S.-backed South Vietnamese incursion into Laos
was called. In White House Years, Kissinger stresses that the
disagreement between
him and the president
was less about substance
on the India-Pakistan
crisis and more about
Nixon’s public relations
attempts
to
deflect
blame: “The result was
CIA Estimate of Soviet
and Chinese military aid
to North Vietnam, 1968–
1973.10
Passport April 2019
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an effort by the White House public relations experts to
deflect onto me the attack on our conduct during the IndiaPakistan crisis. The policy became my policy. For several
weeks Nixon was unavailable to me. Ziegler made no
statement of support, nor did he deny press accounts that I
was out of favor.”
Alluding to the Anderson leaks, Kissinger contended
that “the departments were not admonished to cease their
leaking against me. Nixon could not resist the temptation
of letting me twist slowly, slowly in the wind.”13 Yeoman
Radford admitted taking documents and passing them
to the JCS but denied being the source of the leak under
repeated questioning sessions, including polygraph
examinations. Anderson went to his grave in 2005 without
revealing his source, but he told one author that “you don’t
get those kind of secrets from enlisted men. You only get
them from generals and admirals.”14
Nixon worried aloud about Kissinger suffering an
emotional collapse at the end of 1971 and decided almost
immediately to give him a boost. He made that decision
not because of Vietnam, but rather because of the larger
role Kissinger played in the administration. He could not
afford to lose him with the summit meeting in the Soviet
Union and the opening to the People’s Republic of China
coming up, both of which had been announced before India
and Pakistan blew up. During a dramatic Christmas Eve
conversation, Nixon told his chief domestic advisor, John
Ehrlichman, that “[Kissinger] is extremely valuable to us. He
is indispensable at this point because of the China trip . . . and
to a lesser extent the Russia trip.”15 Two hours later, Nixon
asked Kissinger’s former benefactor, Nelson Rockefeller, to
reassure Kissinger and, somewhat awkwardly, to wish the
Jewish Kissinger a Merry Christmas. “Tell him to pay no
attention to this nitpicking by people how we handled it,”
the president told Rockefeller.16
Getting back to Vietnam, Brigham claims that Nixon
“kept Kissinger at arm’s length about the content of his
Vietnam speech right up until January 12, [1972,] when
he asked for Kissinger’s advice in advance of his troop
withdrawal announcement now scheduled for January
13” (164). Unfortunately, Brigham is factually incorrect on
this point, and the telcon he cites for January 12, 1972, does
not support the claim that Nixon was holding Kissinger at
arm’s length at that time (165, 271).17 The idea of splitting
up the announcement about the peace plan and the
announcement of the withdrawal of 70,000 more American
troops and instead, discussing Vietnam in the State of the
Union address and later making a separate announcement
that Kissinger had been negotiating secretly with the
North Vietnamese for thirty months was not Nixon’s, and
Kissinger was not in the dark. In fact, Kissinger is the one
who recommended precisely this course of action to Nixon
in a phone call captured by Nixon’s taping system on New
Year’s Day 1972:
Kissinger: Mr. President, I have had this idea for
your consideration. I’ve already gone ahead with
[Ambassador Ellsworth] Bunker and everything
is moving for the earliest date [on the troop
withdrawal announcement] you want to go, so—
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: —so nothing is blowing up. Whether
we mightn’t split the troop announcement and
the peace plan? In other words, do the troop
announcement before Congress comes back, and
hit them with the peace plan right after your
State of the Union?
Nixon: Yes, we could do that.
After debating the pros and cons of doing the troop
announcement at different times and speculating about
Page 22

the play it would receive in the press, the president and
his national security advisor came back to the sequence of
announcements:
Kissinger: For the first two or three weeks it’s
going to go like the ceasefire. For the first two or
three weeks it will sweep everything.
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: And therefore, it isn’t all that
disadvantageous supposing they come in with
the Mansfield amendment again.
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: We can prove we made these proposals
before they ever did.
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: So, and then we could say, make the
peace plan, just for an example, around the 25th
[of January].
Nixon: Um-hmm.
Kissinger: Then you’d have two weeks of riding
that.
Nixon: Um-hmm.
Kissinger: Then we come out with the foreign
policy report.18 Then you’re going to China.19
Then you’re in the middle of March. And then
it’s—
Nixon: Mmm. Yeah?
Kissinger: That’s the advantage of doing the
peace plan a little later. While, otherwise, they
might come back at you with a full-scale attack
before you go to China.
Nixon: Um-hmm. Um-hmm.
Kissinger: I have no problem with ever—
whatever, with making the troop announcement
as early as possible.
Nixon: No, there’s no problem on that.
Nixon agreed with Kissinger’s suggestion to have a
separate, televised announcement of the peace plan that the
administration had put forward in secret channels; it would
come after the State of the Union and the troop withdrawal
announcement. The men also explored the possibility
of mentioning the administration’s shift to avoid using
draftees in Vietnam:
Nixon: I would like if we could do the troop
announcement and the draftees, uh, then it
should be done separately from the State of
the Union, I think…I’d like to have the State of
the Union—we’re going to get so much foreign
policy—
Kissinger: That’s right.
Nixon: —benefit from other things that I think
we’d better—
Kissinger: I think if you have the troop
announcements before—
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: —then the State of the Union domestic,
then the peace plan right after the foreign policy
after the State of the Union, say the week after—
Nixon: See, I will just say in the State of the
Union that I am going to make a major report,
“I’m going to make a report to the Congress on
foreign policy on blank, and I will not cover it in
this speech.” Just as I have before.
Kissinger: Yeah. Right, and we will have it ready
this time on the 8th [of January].
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger suggested January 25th as the date to make
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the peace plan announcement, which is what Nixon ended
up doing. Nixon was less receptive to Kissinger’s seemingly
serious suggestion to cut Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird
out of the details:
Kissinger: Ah, ah, Mr. President, I have almost
reached the point where you may have to do this
without telling Laird beforehand.
Nixon: Whoa! Couldn’t do that, Henry, he’d go
up, he’d just—
Kissinger: He’d go up the wall.
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: But, uh—
Nixon: But you’re afraid he’s going to leak it out,
huh?
Kissinger: But I’m afraid he’s going to come back
with so many caveats. Let me talk to Moorer; he
owes us one.20
To be fair, there were no telephone conversation
transcripts of this important conversation. However, the
audio for conversation has been available since the Third
Chronological Release of 2003 and was listed online in 2008
at http://nixontapes.org/hak.html. (The website includes
digital audio of each conversation, NARA-produced finding
aids, and lists which taped conversations overlapped with
telcons.) In addition, the Digital National Security Archive
has a comprehensive collection of Kissinger telcons and
Nixon-Kissinger conversations from the Nixon tapes
available through its subscription service at ProQuest.21
This brings up a minor point, but one that is revealing.
Brigham cites the Kissinger telephone conversation
transcripts as “White House Tapes.” Like the White House
tapes, the telcons have a fascinating history, but they are
an entirely separate collection. Moreover, the telcons were
processed in a unique way and thus differ from many other
textual records and the White House tapes.22 According
to the NARA finding aid, secretaries initially listened to
Kissinger’s phone calls on a “dead key” extension and made
summaries of conversations, although this practice evolved
into verbatim transcripts written up from shorthand notes.
Many conversations were recorded, but the tapes were
immediately transcribed and then destroyed or reused.23
Therefore, citing the telcons as “White House Tapes” simply
is not accurate.
Despite the issues outlined above, I believe Reckless
adds to the debate over the tragedy of U.S. involvement in
Vietnam, an “argument without end,” as Robert McNamara and others put it. If Brigham spurs public discourse on
issues of war and peace and morality, all the better. He is
spot on when he says that nearly as many Americans died
with Nixon and Kissinger at the helm of the ship of state as
during the Johnson years, and the prolongation of the war
was a tragedy for Americans and Vietnamese alike. Further, Brigham is an engaging writer, and Reckless was enjoyable to read. Its shortcomings should serve as a reminder
for historians to properly caveat and contextualize their
sources but always remain open to engage.
Notes:
1. The thoughts and opinions expressed in this publication, in addition to any mistakes, are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the U.S. government or its components.
2. The quote that the Nixon tapes are “the gift that keeps on giving”
is widely attributed to investigative reporter Bob Woodward, of
Watergate fame, who apparently listens to the tapes as he drives.
Bob Woodward, “Landon Lecture” (Kansas State University,
Manhattan, KS, March 29, 2000). http://www.mediarelations.kstate.edu/newsreleases/landonlect/woodwardtext300.html.
3. Nixon Tapes (NT), Oval Office Conversation No. 823–1 between
Nixon and Kissinger, December 14, 1972. This is the same conversation in which Nixon decided to go through with the “Christmas
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Bombing” against North Vietnam.
4. Henry A. Kissinger, “The Viet Nam Negotiations,” Foreign Affairs 47, no. 2 (January 1969).
5. Lyndon B. Johnson, “Speech before the National Legislative
Conference in San Antonio, Texas,” September 29, 1967, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967,
Book II (Washington DC: Govt. Printing Office, 1967), 876–81.
6. David Kraslow and Stuart Loory, “The Secret Search for Peace:
Unheralded Emissaries Opened Way to Hanoi,” Los Angeles Times,
April 4, 1968. See also Hedrick Smith, “Frenchmen Took U.S. Plan
to Hanoi: Harvard Professor Linked Them and Washington,” The
New York Times, April 9, 1968. A profile of Kissinger when he became national security advisor noted his earlier experience with
the French intermediaries and Hanoi. Patrick Anderson, “The
Only Power Kissinger Has Is the Confidence of the President,”
New York Times Magazine, June 1, 1969, 42. Kraslow and Loory were
onto the story as early as December 1967. In a “Memorandum for
the Record,” Benjamin Read wrote that “Kissinger phoned to advise me that he had received a letter from . . . Marcovich in which
M[arcovich] states that LA Times reporter Kraslow has been ‘after
me.’” December 11, 1967, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, TX
(LBJL), National Security File (NSF), Vietnam Country File, Box
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Kissinger the Incompetent

T

Scott Laderman

he last two decades have witnessed a virtual explosion
of scholarship on Henry Kissinger, who must register
as the most polarizing figure in twentieth-century
American diplomacy.1 Kissinger has of course always
commanded attention in the historical literature, though
usually alongside Richard Nixon. Just consider the number
of books in which the words “Nixon, Kissinger, and…”
appear in the title or subtitle.2 Along these same lines,
Kissinger features prominently in a number of important
works exploring the Nixon administration and the Vietnam
War.3
Yet very little of that literature has placed Kissinger
at its center, which is quite surprising when one considers
that the Paris Peace Accords apparently count among his
greatest triumphs—so much so, in fact, that he, along with
the Vietnamese revolutionary Le Duc Tho, was awarded
the 1973 Nobel Peace Prize for his role in negotiating the
agreement. (Tho had the decency to turn the prize down,
explaining that “peace has not yet really been established
in South Vietnam.”4)
Robert Brigham’s Reckless makes a compelling case that
Kissinger’s role in the Indochina wars is undeserving of any
accolades. When Kissinger accepted the offer to serve as
national security adviser in the new Nixon administration,
he shared with the president a pessimism about the war
and a desire “to move on to what they considered more
important foreign policy issues, such as arms limitations
with the Soviets” (11). But the war could not be ignored.
To end it, Nixon and Kissinger would pursue what the
former called “peace with honor.” What this meant was
not entirely clear. In the run-up to the 1968 election, Nixon
had proved masterful at speaking out of both sides of his
mouth. Those championing a military victory over the
Vietnamese revolutionaries interpreted Nixon’s comments
on the war favorably. He was with them, they believed. Yet
those calling for an American withdrawal heard something
quite different: Nixon wanted out.
The challenge for the new administration was how
to continue to seek victory in Vietnam while appeasing
growing antiwar sentiment in the United States. The
solution, according to Nixon, was “Vietnamization.”
The term itself is flawed, as it suggests that the war had
been “American” until then. Hundreds of thousands of
Vietnamese corpses suggest otherwise. But the idea, which
had been pushed by Defense Secretary Melvin Laird (29–30),
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was a compromise of sorts. (Brigham argues that Kissinger
did everything possible to marginalize Laird and Secretary
of State William Rogers, greatly enlarging the staff of his
National Security Council and essentially conducting policy
in secret [65–66].) It appeared to meet Congress’s and the
American public’s desire for an end to the war by gradually
withdrawing American ground troops. This would allow
time for the administration to achieve victory through an
escalation of the air war, in neutral Cambodia as well as
the north, and increased training of ARVN forces. The goal
was to enable the Saigon regime to successfully repel the
revolutionary insurgency and, with American assistance,
survive. Both Nixon and Kissinger felt its survival was
essential to American “credibility.”
While Kissinger shared the goal of a viable Saigon
government, he hated Vietnamization. He believed that
divorcing military operations and diplomacy in Vietnam
had been a problem in earlier years (11), and he thus
saw the presence of U.S. troops as a lever to push the
revolutionaries to concede to American demands. Their
voluntary withdrawal, Kissinger worried, undermined
what little leverage Washington enjoyed. “How,” Brigham
asks, “could U.S. negotiators demand a mutual withdrawal
of U.S. and North Vietnamese troops from South Vietnam
if the United States was going to withdraw its troops
anyway because of domestic political pressure” (27–28)? But
Kissinger consistently failed to appreciate the American
political realities, Brigham notes, including the need to
demonstrate to a frustrated Congress and public that the
war was not without end. What Kissinger needed, then,
were other ways of illustrating to the revolutionaries the
U.S. commitment to a military victory. Initially this meant
the “secret” bombing of Cambodia.
As we now know, the United States had in fact been
bombing Cambodia since at least 1965.5 But the bombing
campaign that Nixon and Kissinger pursued in 1969, which
was dubbed Operation Menu, was a tremendous escalation,
and the consequences of using B-52s to ultimately carpetbomb the country were devastating. (Kissinger, Brigham
writes, “felt no moral qualms” about it [42].) The devastation
was immediate for the tens of thousands of Cambodians
who lost their lives, of course. But the bombing was also
devastating in the longer term. Ben Kiernan and others
have compellingly argued that the American bombing
from 1969 to 1973 was “probably the most important single
factor in Pol Pot’s rise.”6 Readers of Passport are well aware
of what that rise meant, with the Khmer Rouge genocide,
according to leading estimates, killing approximately a
fifth to a quarter of the Cambodian population, or 1.67 to
1.87 million people.7 That horrific loss of life must count
among Henry Kissinger’s legacies.
When Nixon and Kissinger launched the U.S.
“incursion” into Cambodia in 1970, the widespread
domestic opposition that followed apparently surprised
Kissinger, only further underscoring his tin ear when it
came to American politics. He was also taken aback by
the reaction to the “Christmas bombing” in December
1972, which met with outrage both across the United States
and around the world. The growing call to end the war
following the Lam Son 719 operation in Laos seemed to
surprise him, too (146–47).
The Kissinger that appears in Reckless is less a shrewd
diplomat than an incompetent opportunist. He is not a
brilliant strategist or global theorist. Nor is he an “idealist,”
as Niall Ferguson would have it. Rather, he comes across
as an ambitious and amoral climber who thought “his
strategic compass pointed truer than most” (21), and he
was looking to secure his place in the pantheon of great
statesmen. (Whence this “self-confidence” in his abilities
derived is “not entirely clear,” Brigham adds cuttingly
[25].) To get there, he repeatedly played to the president’s
insecurities (139) and misled him about the nature of his
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negotiations in Paris (93, 98, 100, 128, 194) and later, Saigon
him wrongly on the issue. Kissinger’s support for despots
(221, 231). And as Brigham reveals, Kissinger showed no
and genocidaires outside Vietnam could have provided
interest in the concerns of others.
important context for addressing the “bloodbath theory”
This is most evident in his treatment of the RVN
that the Nixon administration quite publicly posited.
authorities. Brigham makes it clear that, whether out of
While scathing in its portrait of Henry Kissinger,
arrogance, racist contempt, or indifference, Kissinger made
Brigham’s book operates within certain frames of reference,
no effort to consult with RVN officials in Saigon while
including the assumption that by the 1970s “South Vietnam”
negotiating the fate of their U.S.-backed government with
had become a legitimate entity worth preserving. Some
Hanoi (99, 155, 196, 207). Indeed, he “purposefully kept
critics will take issue with this. Brigham does not hesitate
Saigon in the dark” (103). He had no appreciation for the
to recognize the corruption and unpopularity of the
complicated politics in the south, including the considerable
RVN government, but he writes that there was a growing
support for a “third force” (83–84).8 He seemed not to care
consciousness of a South Vietnamese identity that led to “a
about South Vietnam at all. He believed “coercive power”
strong sense of cultural and political identification with the
(85) would force Hanoi’s hand in the negotiations, and he
state,” even if people in the south were “dubious about its
seemed totally uninterested in exploring more creative
leadership.”
terms that took Vietnamese political realities into account.
Here Brigham is referring to notable recent scholarship
While for years Kissinger did insist on the preservation of the
that more fully addresses the complexities of southern
RVN regime in the face of Hanoi’s
society in the late 1960s and 1970s.9
insistence that it be dissolved, he
Within this context, Brigham
appeared to do so for the sake of While scathing in its portrait of Henry concludes, the plan negotiated
American credibility. He worried Kissinger, Brigham’s book operates within by Kissinger “was more than
about what the regime’s overthrow certain frames of reference, including the a betrayal of a corrupt Saigon
might suggest about American assumption that by the 1970s “South Vietnam” government”; it represented “the
had become a legitimate entity worth abandonment of all of South
power and security guarantees.
It was with both this global preserving. Some critics will take issue with Vietnam” (225). Kissinger, like
credibility and the domestic this. Brigham does not hesitate to recognize others in the administration, cast
American reaction in mind that the corruption and unpopularity of the RVN the South Vietnamese “as passive
Kissinger and Nixon, by most government, but he writes that there was a actors in their own history, one
accounts, insisted by the end on growing consciousness of a South Vietnamese of the greatest tragedies of the
a “decent interval” between the identity that led to “a strong sense of cultural Vietnam War” (155). For Brigham,
U.S. military withdrawal and what and political identification with the state,” this ultimate betrayal of South
was assumed to be the inevitable even if people in the south were “dubious Vietnam “raises serious questions
about its leadership.”
demise of the Saigon government.
about the efficacy and morality of
Brigham recognizes the idea of
pursuing a war for political means
the “decent interval” (149–52),
that are then surrendered” (220).
but despite acknowledging the evidence suggesting its
Whatever one might think of the war, the division of
explanatory force, he seems unconvinced. “Perhaps”
Vietnam, and the Nixon administration, these are serious
Kissinger pursued it, he writes (215). Brigham explains
and important points. They call into question the myth of
that the national security adviser miscalculated (202), but
Kissinger—which Kissinger himself studiously helped to
he acknowledges that Kissinger did concede that “our
foster—as the man who successfully achieved “peace with
terms will eventually destroy” RVN president Nguyen
honor” in Vietnam. Brigham may not go as far as others
Van Thieu (213). Brigham even calls Hanoi’s overthrow
in painting Kissinger as an unrepentant war criminal
of the Saigon government a “practical outgrowth” of the
who ought to be behind bars, but his excellent new study
eventual settlement, with Kissinger telling Le Duc Tho
does force readers to question the grotesque spectacle of
that the United States was “prepared to start a process in
Kissinger still being toasted on the Washington cocktail
which, as a result of local forces, change can occur” (218).
circuit.
Kissinger, moreover, “did not believe” that “[t]he South is
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Review of Robert Brigham, Reckless: Henry Kissinger
and the Tragedy of Vietnam

W

Luke A. Nichter

ith Reckless: Henry Kissinger and the Tragedy of
Vietnam, Robert Brigham has given scholars a great
gift. We will be talking about this book, and others
it will prompt, for many years. Henry Kissinger, one of the
most significant secretaries of state in American history, has
long been deserving of a fair-minded critique. Neither the
polemicists nor the memoir accounts will stand the test of
time. There is arguably no one else in American history who
served in government for such a short time and left a legacy
that is debated with such passion. That passion continues
to be fueled by the fact that more than four decades after
he left office, Henry Alfred Kissinger is still active at nearly
a century old. Complicating scholarly efforts even further,
newly declassified documents, tapes, and foreign sources
continue to become available to scholars at a staggering
rate, and it takes serious effort simply to keep up with these
releases.
Brigham’s highly readable book has an immensely
ambitious agenda despite containing only six chronological
chapters and under 250 pages of text. The volume tells
the story of Kissinger’s management of the Vietnam War,
which, Brigham says, “remains Kissinger’s most enduring
foreign policy legacy.” He adds that his book “is the first
to hold [Kissinger’s] record to a scrupulous account based
on his own definitions of success” (xi). One does not need
to look much beyond the work’s title, Reckless, to locate
the author’s main conclusion: “It was a total failure. . . .
Kissinger failed in each of his stated goals, to achieve ‘peace
with honor’” (xi).
Brigham goes on to note twelve specific ways in which
Kissinger failed, exuberantly using some form of the
word “failure” thirteen times in two paragraphs (xi). The
book’s bottom-line assessment is that he “did much more
harm than good. . . . Kissinger (no matter what) could not
change reality on the ground. He made a bad situation
worse, however, with his reckless assumption about the
use of force and diplomacy” (xii). One day, when all the
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documents and tapes are released, Brigham’s assessment
might become the conventional wisdom. However, the
presentation in this volume is not convincing for a variety
of reasons.
The first chapter, “The Apprentice,” summarizes
Kissinger’s activities during the 1960s and how he felt
his way into the Vietnam issue prior to being appointed
Nixon’s national security adviser in late 1968. The book
unquestioningly incorporates too much from previous
works. Of Nixon’s campaign headquarters, Brigham says,
“The Pierre [Hotel in Manhattan] was an unlikely place
for the president-elect to have his transition headquarters,
given its ties to the East Coast establishment that Nixon so
despised” (1). A more thoughtful assessment could have
considered whether it was the obvious location for someone
who had practiced law in New York since his defeat in the
1962 California governor’s race. The neighborhood is full of
private clubs with memberships dominated by Republicans,
such as the Links Club, where influential New Yorkers
met in early 1968 and agreed to support Eisenhower’s
loyal former vice president. To them, the bi-coastal Nixon
was the only acceptable compromise between the DeweyLodge-Rockefeller wing of the party, on the one side, and
the Taft-Goldwater-Reagan wing on the other.
Nixon and Kissinger charted their own courses during
the decade, each honing their foreign policy credentials.
Nixon took twice as many trips to Vietnam as Kissinger,
although the latter, with multiple trips under his belt, was
no slouch. Although they moved in different circles, they
did have a link between them that—in a major oversight—
has been overlooked: Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. The liberal
Republican from Massachusetts, who, despite Brigham’s
claim, was not a “presidential hopeful” (15), served in
Vietnam and worked on related issues in more roles and
for a longer period of time than any contemporary. Lodge
was ambassador in 1963–1964 and again from 1965 to 1967,
served as a consultant between his tours and after, and was
appointed to lead the Paris peace talks when the Nixon
administration took office on January 20, 1969.
Kissinger was close to Lodge’s son George and quietly
endorsed his ill-fated 1962 Senate run against another
political newcomer with a famous last name, Edward M.
Kennedy. Lodge hosted Nixon’s visits to Saigon in the
wilderness years and gave Kissinger his first Vietnam
experience, as Lodge’s consultant, in the autumn of
1965. It was in these years that Nixon’s thinking on
Vietnam matured, through trip after trip. His thoughts
are documented in extensive notes handwritten on his
ubiquitous yellow legal pads. Entries from a 1967 trip to
Vietnam, just a year before Kissinger’s appointment, are
particularly noteworthy and offer a kind of blueprint for
his eventual Vietnam policy.
The book’s sparse coverage of Nixon’s and Kissinger’s
activities in the 1960s and of tumultuous changes at home
and in both major political parties makes it feel less like
something Brigham worked on for fifteen years than a hasty
125,000-word response to Niall Ferguson’s first volume in
his biography of Kissinger.1 This weakness is on full display
in his coverage of the pivotal year of 1968. Brigham raises
the old canard that Kissinger leaked secret information
about the Johnson administration’s negotiating position
without identifying what it was, what was secret, what was
significant, and whom it benefited (2). Kissinger was not for
Nixon in 1968; he was for Nelson Rockefeller. In addition,
according to conversations between this reviewer and
former staff members of Vice President Hubert Humphrey,
on two occasions Kissinger offered to serve as a consultant
to the Humphrey campaign.
Brigham gets the politics of the October 31 bombing
halt wrong.2 Since he relies on sources that did no serious
research on the so-called “Chennault Affair,” he gets that
wrong, too. Anna Chennault was a minor player who has
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with both Nixon and Kissinger, Henry Cabot Lodge Jr.
been elevated to a starring actress. She was not “a steadfast
wrote that “U.S. policy in Viet-Nam is truly the spearhead
supporter of Republican politics and politicians” (4), nor was
of a very big aim: to deny the great age of East Asia to the
she ever part of Nixon’s inner circle. In fact, she disagreed
imperialism of Communist China.”4 The American sacrifice
openly with his Vietnam and China policies. As someone
who lost almost everything in her homeland as a result of
in Vietnam could be categorized as a success if the Chinese
the communist takeover of China in 1949, anticommunism
were stopped and a broader Sino-U.S. war were avoided.
was Chennault’s key issue. The primary vehicles for
Vietnam was therefore deeply linked to other matters.
her concerns were usually, but not always, Republicans
The book’s overly siloed focus on Kissinger and
critical of Truman’s China policy, but she was also a strong
Vietnam forces the reader to ignore blind spots that are
supporter of Democrats such as Lyndon Johnson and
too large to ignore. One cannot examine a complicated
Hubert Humphrey and offered to work for them as late as
policy like Kissinger’s role in ending the Vietnam War
1967. Chennault was more complex and more sophisticated
without examining domestic policy, other foreign policies,
than the capricious figure in the accounts Brigham and
American politics, the backgrounds of Nixon and Kissinger
others unquestioningly accept.
and the forces that brought them together, and figures such
There
are
statements
as Johnson, Lodge, Averell
in the book that illuminate
Harriman, and others. The
why
complicated
figures In Brigham’s account of the Nixon White House events documented in the
such as Richard Nixon years, not much is new. On the foundations of Nixon- book did not occur during the
and Henry Kissinger have Kissinger diplomacy, Richard Moss has done a better Kissinger administration; they
escaped nuanced biographical job. On Nixon’s proto-Vietnam policy, Jeffrey Kimball occurred during the Nixon
treatment. “It was not access has written more than anyone. On Kissinger’s pre- administration. Kissinger did
to information that made White House years and how they affected his later not have nearly the freedom of
Kissinger so appealing to thinking, there is Niall Ferguson. On Nixon’s pre- action that Brigham assumes
Nixon,”
Brigham
writes. presidential life, no one has been more thorough, and he did. I asked Kissinger
no one may ever be, than Irwin Gellman.
“It was in equal measures
during a recent meeting how
Kissinger’s understanding of
historians should characterize
power—Nixon believed that
his role in these events,
he needed Kissinger to shape and implement his broad
decades from now, when I am as old as he is. The ninetyforeign policy designs—and his willingness to make
five-year-old responded with none of the “lone cowboy”
difficult decisions in the face of public pressure” (5). No,
bravado emphasized by Brigham: “I played a central role
more significant was the fact that, during the 1960s, Nixon
in a number of creative initiatives, but Nixon was the
and Kissinger each made their own journeys, intellectually
president,” he said.5
There are other issues that are more complicated and
and globally. They were the only members of the loyal
require more nuanced presentation. For example, the tapes
opposition to do so extensively, and they developed similar
reveal that Nixon’s primary concern regarding the Easter
convictions about the importance of ending the domestic
Offensive in 1972 was not losing votes from moderates
and international irritant of Vietnam so that the United
and swing voters, as Brigham says (170), but appearing
States could resume constructive activity. Also, Brigham
tough in the weeks prior to the upcoming Soviet summit.
tells us that Nixon and Kissinger had “a profound disdain
John Connally was the only member of Nixon’s cabinet
for bureaucracy” (7). Did other presidents love bureaucracy?
to recommend the tough response that Nixon used, and
Nixon and Kissinger “were outsiders who distrusted
he was also someone Nixon saw as his natural successor.
establishment liberals” (7). Then how does one explain that
There is some evidence, too, that Nixon’s “electiontheir rise to power occurred through their experiences as
year bombshell” (165) disclosure in his January 25, 1972
insiders, enabled by insiders, with Nixon having one of the
speech—that Kissinger had been sent to Paris beginning
most linear paths to the White House?
in August 1969 as his personal representative to begin
In Brigham’s account of the Nixon White House years,
secret negotiations—had something to do with the Moorernot much is new. On the foundations of Nixon-Kissinger
Radford affair of late 1971. Nixon feared that the Radford
diplomacy, Richard Moss has done a better job. On Nixon’s
documents had been leaked to Jack Anderson, and he
proto-Vietnam policy, Jeffrey Kimball has written more
dreaded the possibility that the American people might
than anyone. On Kissinger’s pre-White House years
learn about Kissinger’s secret mission for the first time
and how they affected his later thinking, there is Niall
in a newspaper column. Disclosing Kissinger’s role was a
Ferguson. On Nixon’s pre-presidential life, no one has
way to get out in front of the scandal. The Moorer-Radford
been more thorough, and no one may ever be, than Irwin
Affair is not mentioned in the book.
Gellman.3 Yes, Nixon widened the war to Cambodia and
Laos, but North Vietnam’s skillful exploitation of the failed
Finally, to say that efforts by the Washington Post to
1962 Laos agreement initially widened the war. The phrase
“continue to unravel” Watergate “eventually led Nixon
“peace with honor” is repeated as being unique to Nixon
to resign the presidency in August” (189) requires one
and Kissinger, even though Lyndon Johnson used it. This
to buy in fully to the Hollywoodized version of All the
reviewer also takes issue with the central claim of the book
President’s Men—a version that caused even Ben Bradlee to
that Kissinger’s “most enduring foreign policy legacy”
say “there’s a residual fear in my soul that that isn’t quite
was Vietnam. No, Kissinger’s most constructive act was to
right.”6 Watergate was unraveled by various investigations,
implement Nixon’s idea of triangular diplomacy, of which
including those of the Ervin Committee, the U.S. Attorney
Vietnam was a part.
for the District of Columbia, the Watergate Special
What brought Nixon and Kissinger together on Vietnam
Prosecution Force, and the House Judiciary Committee. The
was that they came to see that the struggle in Southeast
reporters who have largely been given credit by the public
Asia was not about preventing falling dominoes; it was
and scholars were dependent on leaks, sometimes illegal,
about actual Chinese aggression. Following the communist
from these investigations for their continued reporting.
takeover of the mainland in 1949, such aggression was seen
The book is also not quite what it claims to be as it
in Korea, Taiwan, southwestern China (Xizang, or Tibet),
pertains to research. Part of the problem is that so many key
and along contested borders with India. American leaders
records remain closed: hundreds of hours of presidential
believed the revolutionary Chinese state sought to spread
tapes, NSA wiretaps of the Paris peace talks, Nixon’s
revolution elsewhere. This is not the same thing as the
pre- and post-presidential records, Kissinger’s complete
domino theory. At a time when he was in regular contact
personal papers, and CIA wiretaps on South Vietnamese
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officials, to name just a few examples. No author can be
is no evidence that an updated 2005 edition of this book
held completely accountable for a publisher’s marketing
exists, or, if it does, that it was published by the People’s
claim that a book is based on extensive research at the
Army Publishing House instead of the more appropriate
Nixon Library, on Kissinger’s personal papers, and on
National Political Publishing House [Nha Xuan Ban Chinh
materials from the archives in Vietnam. But while widely
Tri Quoc Gia]. This reviewer is fairly confident that Le Duan
researched, the mining at individual archives is quite
said no such thing in his letters as they were published in
shallow. The volume cites just enough archives, just enough
the original 1965 version.
collections, and just enough of each collection to appear as
A final occasion where this pattern recurs is in chapter 3.
though it were thorough. There is no original work using
Regarding Kissinger’s secret meeting on February 21, 1970,
the Nixon tapes, which would have been a goldmine for a
with Le Duc Tho, Brigham writes, “Although he made no
book like this. Among the sources the author lists that are
mention of it to Kissinger, Tho told his associates in Hanoi
now available to scholars, Brigham does not even mention
that he thought Washington would eventually be forced to
the Nixon tapes, or the fact that more than five hundred
concede on the troop withdrawal to end the American war”
hours remain restricted (xii). If the author wanted to get
(96–97). Again, it is a key point in support of the view that
full value from the tapes, he could have compared precisely
Kissinger exceeded his authority during negotiations in
what Kissinger said to Nixon with what Kissinger then said
which he was outmatched. However, the book cited simply
to others in order to bolster his argument that Kissinger
provides a report on Kissinger’s presentation during their
betrayed the president.7
meeting, and Tho says nothing about the United States
In addition, the papers of Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. are
being “eventually forced to concede on the mutual troop
cited, but the most valuable portions, as they pertain to
withdrawal.”13
Kissinger’s early years and the Vietnam negotiations, are
The book is not all bad, however. Since it is the first in a
not cited.8 These are critically important, not just because
new genre, the critics will naturally be harsh on it—this one
Lodge spent more time working on the subject of Vietnam in
included. But Brigham is impressively balanced on some
more capacities than any other contemporary and because
topics where his predecessors were not. His best material
his relationship with Nixon went back to the early 1950s,
is in chapter 6, “Peace is at Hand.” In fact, following the
but because Lodge’s role in elevating Henry Kissinger has
attention-getting introduction, the rest of the book as a
been overlooked. “You started the sequence that led to this
whole is surprisingly balanced.
appointment by inviting me to Saigon. I shall not forget this,”
For example, some scholars have had an almost singleKissinger wrote to Lodge on December 10, 1968, after being
minded obsession with the “decent interval” theory to
named Nixon’s national security adviser.9 The research at
explain Nixon and Kissinger’s overarching Vietnam theory.
Brigham is more nuanced (150–51).
the National Archives Center 2 in Ho
Chi Minh City looks especially thin. By using foreign documentation, It is absurd to believe that strict
Two endnotes cite two documents, and Brigham has admittedly gone further adherence to a single philosophical
one of those is a collection of public than many American diplomatic concept explained all actions taken
government statements.10
historians. He deserves credit for that. by Nixon and Kissinger with respect
By using foreign documentation, However, it is fair to ask whether he has to Vietnam. The tapes reveal that
Brigham has admittedly gone further interpreted this foreign documentation on some days they felt the war was
going well and on others they were
than many American diplomatic
properly.
pessimistic. Their moods, words, and
historians. He deserves credit for
actions revolved around many things
that. However, it is fair to ask whether
outside of their direct control: the weather in Vietnam,
he has interpreted this foreign documentation properly.
weekly casualty figures, and domestic political opinion.
Similar questions could be asked about his earlier works,
There are even times when adherents of the decent interval
Guerilla Diplomacy and ARVN.11 Citations to foreign works
theory are too generous. On some days Nixon and Kissinger
are time consuming and more difficult to inspect. For
spoke about desiring no interval at all other than the time
example, Brigham makes a significant claim that after
necessary to withdraw POWs and get out. Finally, Brigham
Kissinger met with Xuan Thuy on August 4, 1969, at Jean
does not blame Nixon and Kissinger for the overthrow
Sainteny’s apartment in Paris, he told the North Vietnamese
that Nixon was prepared to open a secret communications
of Sihanouk (111). North Vietnam had a longer history of
channel and would create the most favorable circumstances
destabilizing Cambodia than the Americans did, although
to arrive at a solution (64–65). The claim is central to
this is overlooked by many scholars.
Brigham’s broader argument that Kissinger was reckless,
The Vietnamese have a phrase—đầu voi, đuôi chuột.
acted without authority and betrayed Nixon. However, the
It means the head of an elephant and the tail of a mouse, which
book cited, by Bai Ban Bo, covers only secret contacts with
can be translated as “making a mountain out of a molehill.”
Kissinger during the Johnson administration and does not
Robert Brigham has performed an admirable service by
discuss such contact in 1969. The citation to the book is also
offering a critique of Henry Kissinger’s Vietnam diplomacy.
more wrong than right. It was indeed published in 1985, but
With the appropriate passage of time, Kissinger deserves
not by Nha Xuat Ban Su That in Hanoi as claimed, but by
a dispassionate critique commensurate with the role he
Ho Chi Minh City Publishing House in the former Saigon.12
played in these historic events. That is not this book. It will
Another occasion in which Brigham uses a difficult-totake a bigger book to mine the tapes, personal papers, and
verify foreign source to bolster his broader arguments is
newly declassified documents in the United States and
endnote fifty-eight in chapter 2. He writes that “Le Duan
numerous foreign countries. Kissinger is only ninety-five.
had disapproved of negotiations in general ever since the
Perhaps it is still too soon.
1954 debacle at Geneva, which had divided Vietnam at the
Notes:
seventeenth parallel following its war with France. He was
1. See Niall Ferguson, Kissinger, vol. 1, 1923–1968: The Idealist (New
a southerner who believed that the party had surrendered
York, 2015). Ferguson started a conversation that will only be amat the negotiating table what it had rightfully won on the
plified once the second volume of his biography is published. He
battlefield, leaving the South an occupied land in the hands
deserves a response, but it should be as well researched as his
of the American allies in Saigon.” The citation is not to a
conversation starters. This reviewer, for one, is hesitant to depage but to an entire book, Le Duan, Thu vao Nam [Letters
scribe Kissinger as an idealist in the 1960s. He was hardworking,
to the South] (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Quan Doi Nhan Dan,
ideologically malleable, ambitious, and sufficiently successful
2005). The missing page number citation makes it difficult
with the mainstream of both major political parties that he was
to check another critical part of Brigham’s argument. There
an obvious choice for a political appointment no matter who won
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in 1968. But that does not make him an idealist.
2. Currently the best book on this subject, including the bombing halt, the 1968 election, and the relationship between President
Lyndon Johnson and Vice President Hubert Humphrey, is Arnold
Offner’s Hubert Humphrey: The Conscience of the Country (New Haven, CT, 2018). However, most scholars continue to cite the more
sensational accounts written by non-scholars.
3. See Richard A. Moss, Nixon’s Back Channel to Moscow: Confidential Diplomacy and Détente (Lexington, KS, 2017); Jeffrey Kimball
and William Burr, Nixon Nuclear Specter: The Secret Alert of 1969,
Madman Diplomacy, and the Vietnam War (Lawrence, KS, 2015);
Niall Ferguson, Kissinger; and Irwin Gellman, The Contender: Richard Nixon, The Congress Years, 1946–1952 (New York, 1999) and The
President and the Apprentice: Eisenhower and Nixon, 1952–1961 (New
Haven, CT, 2016).
4. “United States Policy in Vietnam,” Undated, Reel 23, Microfilm
Edition, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. Papers II, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, MA (hereafter MHS).
5. Meeting with Henry Kissinger, New York, NY, June 27, 2018,
3:30–4:30 p.m.
6. See Jeff Himmelman, Yours in Truth: A Personal Portrait of Ben
Bradlee (New York, 2012), 214.
7. Brigham extensively cites my work, published with Douglas
Brinkley, The Nixon Tapes: 1971–1972 (Boston, 2014). While the
work offers by far the most Nixon tape transcripts in one volume,
many having to do with Vietnam were cut during production
due to space limitations. In addition, there are many that have not
been transcribed. It would have been especially fruitful to listen
to and transcribe portions from the time Kissinger left for another
negotiating session, or just after he returned.
8. Recently I reviewed all of Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.’s personal
papers at the Massachusetts Historical Society for my upcoming
biography of him, to be published by Yale University Press. If not
for this deep dive over the past four years, I could not have written this review with the same level of detail. The best parts of
Lodge’s papers as they pertain to Brigham’s book include Reels
9–10, 13–14, and 22–23, Microfilm Edition, Henry Cabot Lodge,
Jr. Papers II, which provide important background on the Nixonera Vietnam negotiations, the relationship between Lodge and
Kissinger and Nixon, and what the Nixon administration learned
from the LBJ negotiations. In addition, Reel 12 covers Lodge-Nixon conversations during the transition and early part of the new
administration, Vietnam negotiations, and Lodge’s role leading
the talks in Paris. Lodge also wrote countless memoranda for the
file, which, taken together, are at times as thorough as a diary.
His “Lessons of Vietnam” in Reel 20, written in 1973, is one that
is particularly relevant to Brigham’s book. Another is “United
States Policy in Vietnam” in Reel 23.
9. Letter from Henry Kissinger to Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., December 10, 1968, Reel 9, Microfilm Edition, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.
Papers II, MHS.
10. In Brigham’s acknowledgments, he writes that “Tung Vu conducted research in the Vietnamese archives in Ho Chi Minh City.”
The computerized finding aids in the research room at the Trung
Tam Luu Tru Quoc Gia II [National Archives Center II] are not as
intuitive as, say, a Google search. The folder level index includes
typographical errors, and unless searches are made with all spelling variations, including the errors, one might not locate all relevant material. For example, there are an especially large number
of variations of the spelling of Robert McNamara’s last name.
Although there are many more documents in existence, the only
two documents that Brigham cites, in endnotes 6 and 9 of chapter
one (p. 248), are Tuyen bo, Thong cao, Thong diem cua Chinh phi
VNCH ve cac bien pap hgung ban nam 1968, November 1, 1968
[Statement of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam on November 1968, Declarations, Announcements, and Messages of the
Government of the Republic of Vietnam on Ceasefires of 1968];
and Ve tinh hinh chinh tri va chinh sach ngoai giao cua Hoa Ky,
1968–1975 [On the Political Atmosphere and Foreign Policy of the
United States, 1968–1975].
11. See Robert Brigham, Guerilla Diplomacy: The NLF’s Foreign Relations and the Vietnam War (Ithaca, NY, 1998) and ARVN: Life and
Death in the South Vietnamese Army (Lawrence, KS, 2006).
12. See Mai Ban No, Tan cong ngoia [sic] giao [Diplomatic Offensive
and Secret Contacts] (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Su That, 1985), 165–68.
Brigham, on pp. 64–65, offers a citation to this book for the following: “the President of the United States is prepared to open
another, secret channel with Vietnam to appoint a high-ranking
representative of competence to have productive discussions. . . .
If this channel is opened, the United States will adjust its military
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activities to create the most favorable circumstances to arrive at
a solution.” However, there is nothing in Mai Van Bo’s book on
Kissinger’s secret talks in 1969.
13. The following is a translation of pgs. 249–50 of Bo Ngoai Giao
[Ministry of Foreign Affairs], Dai su ky chuyen de: Dau Tranh Ngoai
Giao va von dong quoc te trong nhung chien cong My, cuu nuoc [Special
Chronology: The Diplomatic Struggle and International Activities of the
Anti-American Resistance and National Salvation] (Hanoi: Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, 1987):
From Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thuy to the Politburo:
Content of the private meeting between Xuan Thuy and
Kissinger.
-Military: The U.S. is prepared to discuss the total withdrawal
of all U.S. forces, including the troops of allied armies and
the total dismantling of U.S. military bases that did not exist
before the Americans arrived. The U.S. will withdraw their
troops in phases and complete the withdrawal within 16
months of the signing of an agreement. The time schedule
for the withdrawal will be based on the number of troops
currently in South Vietnam, which as of April 15, 1970, was
422,000 men.
-Inspection of the withdrawal: Kissinger wants to make this
a part of any agreement in order to ensure that the two sides
withdraw their forces and implement the agreement.
-Prisoners of war held by the two sides will be released
during the first phase of the troop withdrawal (during the
first five months).
-Kissinger brought up the withdrawal of all non-South
Vietnamese forces and presented an order for the withdrawal
of these forces:
-25% to be withdrawn after six months;
-50% to be withdrawn after eight months;
-75% to be withdrawn after twelve months;
-All to be totally withdrawn after sixteen months.
In general, Kissinger only talked about military issues and
said nothing about a political settlement.
Our side:
-Criticized the U.S. for trying to separate military matters
from the political problem.
-Criticized the U.S. for expanding the war into Laos and
Cambodia.
(Incoming Cable, Volume 182, Archives Office, Foreign
Ministry)
Tho reports absolutely nothing from his conversation with
Kissinger in which the latter said that the U.S. would be
“eventually forced to concede on the mutual troop withdrawal.”

Review of Robert K. Brigham, Reckless: Henry Kissinger
and the Tragedy of Vietnam

I

David F. Schmitz

n the days leading up to D-Day, June 6, 1944, President
Franklin D. Roosevelt prepared two announcements.
The first, which told the American people about the
successful operation and the establishment of a beachhead
in Normandy, France, was the one actually released. The
second was prepared in case the cross-channel attack met
disaster. Roosevelt was prepared to take full responsibility
and blame for the failure.
The contrast between FDR’s approach to D-Day and
the approach of President Richard Nixon and his National
Security Advisor Henry A. Kissinger to events in Vietnam
could not be greater. In one of the striking examples
from Robert K. Brigham’s superb study of Kissinger’s
management of the war in Vietnam, Brigham points out
that the finger-pointing and blaming of others for the failure
of the incursion into Laos in 1971, Operation Lam Son 719,
began even before the operation started and was typical
behavior for Kissinger, who refused to take responsibility
for any mistakes, failures, and shortcomings during his
time in office. This is just one of the many insights and
key themes Brigham explores in his seminal study of
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Kissinger’s role in the Nixon administration’s negotiations
his negotiations with Le Duc Tho is either incomplete or
with Hanoi from 1969 to the signing of the Paris Peace
deliberately distorted.
Accords in January 1973.
From 1969 to 1973, and subsequently, Kissinger had to
Kissinger entered office believing the only way to
keep changing his positions and explanations because he
end the war was through a negotiated agreement. From
held to incorrect assumptions about the Vietnam War. This
his perspective there were, as Brigham notes, “simply too
behavior started with an early articulation of the madman
many explicit constraints on US power to make a military
theory, which Kissinger expressed during his first weeks
victory likely” (ix). At the outset, Kissinger believed he
in office. He wanted to make the North Vietnamese think
could achieve a settlement that was based on a mutual
that Nixon was utterly obsessed with beating communism;
withdrawal of North Vietnamese and U.S. troops (as well
and he was convinced, Brigham shows, that North Vietnam
as the removal of Hanoi’s forces from Cambodia and Laos),
“would be forced to negotiate a mutual withdrawal from
the recognition of the DMZ as an international boundary,
South Vietnam” despite having “no evidence to support
a release of all POWs, and the preservation of the Saigon
these claims” (24). “I can’t believe that a fourth-rate power
government intact and in full control in South Vietnam.
like North Vietnam doesn’t have a breaking point,” he said.
Kissinger’s goal, Brigham writes, was “to negotiate a final
All the United States had to do, he told Nixon, was “hit
peace agreement in Paris that traded an American exit from
them” and “Hanoi would beg ‘for private talks’” (x).
Vietnam for political guarantees for Saigon” (x). As the
Kissinger would also encourage Nixon “to think
author unequivocally states: the national security advisor’s
that acts of toughness—such as bombing Cambodia—
effort “was a total failure. Kissinger failed
could substitute for tactical and strategic
in each of his stated goals to achieve ‘peace Brigham’s work, as he notes, disadvantage in Vietnam” (41). Therefore,
with honor’” (xi).
is the first comprehensive he negotiated by issuing ultimatums and
Brigham’s work, as he notes, is the study of “Kissinger’s strategic threats, which the North Vietnamese
first comprehensive study of “Kissinger’s and diplomatic failures on the dismissed or ignored. Another constant
strategic and diplomatic failures on the final peace agreement.” It sets that Kissinger held to in the face of clear
final peace agreement.” It sets out to show out to show that “Kissinger’s evidence to the contrary, including Soviet
that “Kissinger’s misplaced faith in his misplaced faith in his own denials, was that Moscow could force
own abilities to secure an honorable peace abilities to secure an honorable Hanoi to make concessions favorable to
prolonged the war unnecessarily and peace prolonged the war Washington.
sealed South Vietnam’s fate” (xii). In this unnecessarily and sealed South
Brigham argues that Kissinger’s
Reckless brilliantly succeeds.
Vietnam’s fate” (xii). In this style of negotiating ran contrary both
However, Brigham also does much
to negotiating theory and to successful
Reckless brilliantly succeeds.
more. He shows how the national security
examples of negotiations from history.
advisor “made a bad situation worse …
Instead of building “a negotiations
with his reckless assumptions about the use of force and
constituency,” he isolated himself and cut out the rest of
diplomacy” (xii). In addition to explicating how Kissinger’s
the national security bureaucracy along with Congress and
failures stemmed from his shortcomings as a negotiator and
Saigon. In place of “first negotiating principles,” Kissinger
how his tactics deepened the tragedy of Vietnam, Robert
“conditioned each meeting in Paris with military escalation,
Brigham challenges and corrects many of Kissinger’s and
or at least the threat of escalation,” an approach that has
his defenders’ distortions, setting the record straight on
never yielded success (66-68).
a number of important points. He directly rejects Niall
This strategy led to a lack of “buy-in” for the talks
Ferguson’s recent portrayal of Kissinger as an idealist,
among allies and to long periods of inactivity. Kissinger
stating he was “a classical realist who ironically acted with
remained focus on the stick of military power and failed to
great emotion and personalized much of his effort to secure
make negotiations a sufficiently attractive carrot for Hanoi.
America’s place in the international system. As a lone actor,
“His coercive strategy in Paris lacked vision, shutting out
an instrument of free will, he was determined to shape
potential allies. Altering this approach would have taken
history” (45).
away from his privileged position, but it might have led to
Brigham also rejects the theory that Kissinger sought a
more expansive and coordinated negotiations to end the
decent interval for withdrawal. Rather, the national security
war” (66-68).
advisor held “to the idea that he could coordinate punishing
Finally, from the outset, the national security advisor
military strikes against North Vietnam with diplomacy in
cut Saigon out of the negotiations of the war to enhance his
Paris” to achieve his goal, which by 1972 was not saving
control over the process and to keep South Vietnam in the
South Vietnam but was “getting Nixon reelected” (150-151).
dark about the concessions he was making over time in his
Brigham further demonstrates that Kissinger developed
effort to secure a peace deal prior to the 1972 presidential
his policies toward Vietnam and negotiated in Paris from
election. As Brigham notes, when Kissinger ultimately
a series of false assumptions and premises about the war
realized he could not achieve a mutual troop withdrawal
and Hanoi’s goals. In the end, of course, Kissinger’s efforts
and switched to the position of seeking a standstill ceaseonly resolved the role of the United States in the war in
fire to enable the United States to devise a process for the
Vietnam as he willingly sacrificed the needs of Saigon to
final removal of U.S. forces, he did so without informing,
conclude a deal.
much less consulting, Saigon. When the Thieu government
Henry Kissinger has worked hard to shape a favorable
learned the details about the agreement, it balked. Nixon
portrayal of his role in Vietnam through his writings and
briefly backed Saigon, but in the end joined with Kissinger
public appearances, and despite the obvious failure of the
to force Saigon to accept the Paris agreement that sealed its
Paris Peace Agreement, he continues to be seen by many
fate.
in power and in the public as a wise senior statesman.
I have a couple of concerns that arise from solely
Brigham consistently challenges Kissinger’s version of
focusing on Kissinger and seeking to correct many of the
events wherever the historical record clearly demonstrates
national security advisor’s distortions and lies both when
that the former national security advisor has dissembled to
he uttered them and when he wrote about events later. The
further his own image. Space will not allow for a discussion
chronology gets confusing at a few points as the time frame
of all the cases, but Brigham demonstrates, for example,
shifts so Brigham can follow through on a theme. This,
that Kissinger did support the Cambodian invasion even
however, is a small price to pay for the value of Brigham’s
though he has worked hard to keep his role secret and
judicious analysis and weighing of the evidence against
create a different impression, and that his recounting of
Kissinger’s claims.
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A more substantive concern involves the explanation of
Author’s Response
how the Nixon administration would escalate in 1969 at the
same time it announced it was pursuing Vietnamization and
Robert K. Brigham
beginning the troop withdrawals that would consistently
undercut Kissinger’s and Nixon’s threats. Brigham writes
want to thank the four reviewers of Reckless for their
that after a National Security Council meeting on January
time, energy, and comments. SHAFR members are
25, 1969, “no one present … could have predicted that the
known for taking ideas seriously, and I was pleased
administration would pursue
to see that these reviewers lived
military escalation and troop
up to that reputation. I was
withdrawals simultaneously” (27). A more substantive concern involves the especially heartened that all four
By examining only Kissinger’s explanation of how the Nixon administration found Reckless highly readable
position, Brigham misses the fact would escalate in 1969 at the same time it and a valuable contribution to the
that when Nixon came to office, announced it was pursuing Vietnamization discussion on the Vietnam War.
he still believed the United States and beginning the troop withdrawals that All four reviewers also wished
could win the war militarily, and would consistently undercut Kissinger’s and that I had expanded my portrait of
he held to that position until the
Kissinger to include other aspects
Nixon’s threats.
failure in Cambodia in April and
of his foreign policy agenda that
May 1970. Meanwhile, Kissinger
might shed light on the Vietnam
saw escalation and bombing as a threat in negotiations.
negotiations. This is a fair critique. Deciding what to include
To try and win the war by force, the president had to buy
and what to leave out of a trade press book written for a
political time for his madman policy to work. He therefore
general reading audience—and with a strict word limit—is
set out to create the impression that he was starting to
always difficult.
wind the war down through Vietnamization while he was
Scott Laderman clearly understands and agrees with
actually escalating it through the secret bombing campaign
the main themes of the book. He was particularly drawn
and planning for Operation Duck Hook and the invasion
to the idea that Kissinger never fully appreciated American
of Cambodia. The national security advisor opposed the
political realities, “including the need to demonstrate to
troop withdrawals, in part, because they were associated
a frustrated Congress and public that the war was not
with and supported by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird
without end.” Kissinger was much more interested in
and, as Brigham clearly demonstrates, Kissinger wanted to
domestic politics than any of his writings on the Vietnam
keep Laird away from decision making on Vietnam.
War indicate. More work needs to be done to highlight
Kissinger also opposed Vietnamization because he
the strained relationship between Kissinger, the public,
knew the impact it would have on his ability to threaten
and Congress. Laderman also found intriguing the issue
the North Vietnamese. Thus, he and Nixon were not
of South Vietnam’s legitimacy, and I must confess that
always on the same page, a situation that led the national
this remains a topic that fascinates me. Much of the new
security advisor to consistently misrepresent the content of
writing on Vietnam from those with significant language
his talks with the North Vietnamese in Paris. As Brigham
skills focuses on the “idea” of South Vietnam.1 This is also a
explains, Kissinger wanted to keep his secret talks alive
subtext in some of the writings by Viet Thanh Nguyen, Thi
and “concluded therefore that truthful reporting of these
Bui, Andrew Lam, and Andrew Pham, among others.
meetings threatened that goal because the president was
Any author appreciates it when a reviewer focuses
not fully committed to a negotiated settlement” (108).
almost exclusively on the main themes of the book, and this
Like so many of Nixon’s and Kissinger’s policies toward
is certainly true of David Schmitz’s review. He suggests
Vietnam, Vietnamization conflicted with other policies,
that Reckless is, at its heart, a book about Kissinger and the
and it ultimately failed.
secret negotiations in Paris. He understands my criticisms
In his conclusion, Brigham pulls no punches. “Despite
of Kissinger as a negotiator. He also agrees that Kissinger’s
his considerable intellect and talent,” Brigham states,
efforts “only confirmed suspicions about the part the United
“Kissinger was never able to secure a peace agreement that
States had played in the war in Vietnam, as he willingly
settled the major question of the war: the political future of
sacrificed the needs of Saigon to conclude a deal.” For
South Vietnam” (243). North Vietnamese forces remained
example, the final peace agreement did not include a mutual
in South Vietnam as the United States left, leaving Saigon
troop withdrawal from South Vietnam. By agreement, ten
to fight on its own. The United States originally escalated
PAVN main force infantry divisions were allowed to stay
its commitment in 1965 because South Vietnam could not
in South Vietnam. There were no enforcement mechanisms
succeed on its own despite ten years of American aid and
built into the peace agreement. There was no legitimate
military support. The subsequent eight years of fighting
oversight for a political process in South Vietnam after
had not changed that reality.
an American withdrawal. Schmitz also supports my view
Nixon and Kissinger could have achieved similar
that Kissinger thought that toughness could help replace
result from the Paris Peace Agreement in 1969 without
any political, tactical, or strategic disadvantages the United
four more years of fighting. Brigham thus concludes that
States may have faced in Vietnam. Being tough did not
“the war in Vietnam was an American disaster” made
always work out the way Kissinger intended.
even worse by the escalations and by the duplicity of the
Luke Nichter and I disagree on the degree to which
Nixon administration. Nonetheless, Kissinger, “despite
Kissinger’s ego and ambition (and emotions) influenced his
his failures in Vietnam, has emerged as a symbol of
negotiating strategy in Vietnam. I thank Nichter for finding
American shrewdness in exercising power.” Reckless fully
a few Vietnamese citations that were mangled by my
demonstrates how wrong that view is and how Kissinger
dyslexia software. On the meeting with Jean Sainteny on
“recklessly sought ends beyond his mean” (244).
August 4, 1969, the quote is entirely accurate. Its source is
Luu Van Loi and Nguyen Anh Vu, Cac cuoc thuong luong Le
Duc Tho-Kissinger tai Paris (91–92). The English translation
of the same book, Le Duc Tho-Kissinger Negotiations in Paris,
carries that same passage on page 100.2
Le Duan’s well-known opposition to negotiations and
his emphasis on the need to build up revolutionary forces
are major themes of his “Letters to the South,” properly
cited as Le Duan, Thu Vao Nam (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Su
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That, 1965). For a good description of Le Duan’s attitude
toward negotiations, see Lien-Hang Nguyen’s Hanoi’s War.
She writes that “Le Duan, who had already marginalized
Ho Chi Minh in the Party leadership by invoking his
failed negotiation attempts with the French, remained
apprehensive of a diplomatic solution and moved to block
the powerful ‘peace’ proponents. In other words, he drew a
significant lesson from the First Indochina War: diplomacy
without military superiority should be avoided at all costs.”3
I appreciate Nichter’s suggestions for further research on
Lodge and the political turmoil of 1968.
Richard Moss has some questions about Lam Son 719.
He rightfully criticizes my use of a conversation between
Westmoreland and Kissinger in April 1971 to show the
general’s opposition to the Laos invasion by ARVN troops
that began in February 1971. I should have used an earlier
source—one from December 11, 1970—that clearly shows
that Westmoreland had been critical of Abrams’s plans for
a frontal assault on Laos using ARVN troops all along.4
For intelligence reports available to Kissinger showing
increased PAVN strength in Laos, see Richard Hunt’s
Melvin Laird and the Foundation of the Post-Vietnam Military,
1969–1973. James Willbanks discusses ongoing intelligence
assessments on the PAVN in A Raid Too Far: Operation Lam
Son 719 and Vietnamization in Laos.5
Moss disagrees with my conclusion that Nixon was
keeping Kissinger at arm’s length in late December 1971
and early January 1972, following the Radford affair
and the Jack Anderson piece in the Washington Post. One
source for my thinking is Kissinger. On December 30, 1971,
Kissinger confides to Haldeman that the “president has lost
confidence in him.” He feels that Nixon has been handling
him the way he handled Rogers, “and this worries him.”
During that same conversation, Kissinger even threatened
to resign his NSA position.6 Kissinger also told a friend that
he feared he “was out of favor” with the president.7
Historian Robert Dallek agrees. “Nixon limited Henry’s
access to him,” he writes. “Regular morning meetings with
the president were canceled and Nixon would not take
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Henry’s phone calls.”8 Moss also claims that the footnote
associated with my assessment of Nixon’s cool treatment
of Kissinger “does not support the claim that Nixon was
holding Kissinger at arm’s length at that time.” But there
is no such footnote. That sentence, on page 164 of Reckless,
does not have a footnote. I use other sources earlier in the
text to reach that determination. The footnote Moss refers to
comes two footnotes and two paragraphs later, on page 165
(fn. 14). It shows that Nixon eventually brought Kissinger
in from the cold on January 12 to help with his Vietnam
speeches of January 1972. The footnote is clearly about their
conversation of January 12, not the events that proceeded it.
Moss does ask one very important question. Since
Kissinger was “boxed in by the realities on the ground
and by Nixon’s desire to Vietnamize the war, what were
the alternatives to using force?” I answer that question
throughout Reckless, as I explore paths not taken by
Kissinger and opportunities missed in Washington, Paris,
and Saigon.
Notes:
1. See the work of Sean Fear, Ed Miller, and Nu-Anh Tran.
2. Luu Van Loi and Nguyen Anh Vu, Cac cuoc thuong luong Le Duc
Tho-Kissinger tai Paris (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Cong an Nhan Dan,
1996), 91–92; Le Duc Tho-Kissinger Negotiations in Paris (Hanoi: Gioi
Publishers, 1996).
3. Lien-Hang Nguyen, Hanoi’s War (Chapel Hill, NC, 2012), 78.
4. For a good discussion of Westmoreland’s opposition to
Abrams’s plan, see Richard A. Hunt, Melvin Laird and the Foundation of the Post-Vietnam Military, 1969–1973 (Washington DC, 2015),
176–77. Footnote 37 on page 177 gives a host of sources on this
conversation and on Moorer’s decision on December 18 to reject
Westmoreland’s suggestions for a quick air mobile attack on Laos
and instead to follow the Abrams plan.
5. Hunt, Melvin Laird, 175, 179; James Willbanks,
A Raid Too Far: Operation Lam Son 719 and Vietnamization in Laos (College Station, TX, 2014), 115.
6. H.R. Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White
House (New York, 1994), 388.
7. As quoted in Robert Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power (New York, 2007), 351.
8. Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger, 351.
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